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Abstract. The main goal of this paper is to evaluate the impact of governance on economic 
growth using a group of 188 countries. Although our main focus is on the 21 Middle 
Eastern and North African (MENA) countries, our findings can be applied to the other 
countries as well. There are two main contributions in this paper. The first contribution is 
we are able to create a “composite governance index” (CGI) that summarizes the existing 
six governance measurements; the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), using the 
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) method. The first principal component derived from 
the WGIs explains as large as 81% of the variations in the original six WGI measurements, 
which indicates that it can be used as a strong indicator for evaluating government’s 
managerial ability and effectiveness. Following the creation of CGI, the second 
contribution is we are able to quantify the marginal contribution of improvement in 
governance to economic performance using PPP adjusted constant per capita GDP data. We 
find that the per capita GDP would rise by about 2% if the CGI increases by one unit. 
Using the Rule of 70, the marginal estimate further indicates a mere five-unit improvement 
in CGI would double the country’s per capita GDP in seven years. Nonetheless, the effect 
of improvement of governance can not account for the higher than expected per capita GDP 
in most of the oil rich MENA countries. In other words, the majority of the MENA 
countries have achieved fragile levels of economic growth that does not depend on sound 
governance.. 
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1. Introduction 
here is no doubt that improving the business climate is a major factor for 
attracting both national and international investors to a country, which 
would ultimately be reflected in increasing economic growth. Investors will 
drive away from a politically unstable, bureaucratic, highly corrupted economy, 
and where the government is not delivering its services transparently and 
efficiently. A government that is socially accountable in delivering services and 
responsive to the needs of its citizens will ultimately create a democratic 
environment leading to inclusive growth and human development. 
The slow growth performances in many developing countries, especially 
Middle East and North African (MENA) countries, have been disappointing over 
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the last decade. Since the second half of the 1980’s, growth and development 
studies have started to shed the light on the importance of improving institutions of 
governance on economic growth. The studies of Owens (1987) and Sen (1999) 
show that economic and political stability has a statistical significant impact on 
economic growth and development.  
Many scholars and researchers have confirmed the positive link of improved 
quality of governance on economic growth. The study of Knack & Keefer (1997) 
shows that both property rights and contract enforcement have positive impact on 
economic growth. Similarly, Campos & Nugent (1999) prove a statistically 
significant positive impact of governance on economic development. The work of 
Kaufmann, et al. (1999a and 1999b) reaches the same conclusion about the 
importance of governance to economic development. Similar findings are reached 
in the work of Knack & Keefer (1995) and Mauro (1995).  
Many of the research work of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
United Nations, and the World Bank shows that good governance leads to 
economic growth. For instance, Kaufman & Kraay (2002) evaluate the World 
Governance Indicators over the period 1996 to 2002 and find a positive 
relationship between per capita income and quality of governance.  
One of the leading studies in the literature on institution is the paper by 
Acemoglu, et al. (2000) which shows that differences in economic performance 
among different nations can be attributed to the difference in institutions.  The 
paper shows that different colonization strategies have led to different types of 
institutions that remained until today. Colonies with low mortality rates had higher 
European settlements and accordingly stronger institutions were built which 
ultimately explains differences between countries in terms of current performance. 
Furthermore, the work of Acemoglu, et al. (2005b) concludes that differences 
between countries in terms of income and economic development are explained by 
differences in institutions. Within the same lines, Acemoglu & Robinson (2008) 
show that differences in economic prosperity among nations can be explained by 
differences in political institutions. Their paper provides policy recommendations 
that reforming institutions would help in poverty alleviation. Additionally, the 
work of Chauvet & Collier (2004) finds that developing countries with poor quality 
of governance will lead to less economic growth. And within the same lines, the 
cross sectional of study by Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) compares adjacent cities 
along the United States-Mexico border. They reach the conclusion that political 
and economic institutions underlie economic success and the degree of incentive 
structures and the state-market relationship is the determinant factor of cities’ 
growth performance.  
Given the previous background, the research on the link between governance 
and economic growth for the MENA region is relatively very thin. The World 
Bank’s World Governance Indicator project shows that the MENA region always 
ranks below the average of the sample. This World Bank project seeks to measure 
the quality of governance in a particular nation using six metrics: Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, 
Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. These metrics are measured both by a 
Governance Score that ranges from -2.5 to +2.5, and a Percentile Rank relative to 
nations worldwide. 
The study of Leenders & Sfakianakis (2002) shows that the Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia 
and Libya is below the global median in terms of levels of public sector corruption. 
Similarly, the World (2003) study shows that the MENA countries perform lower 
than countries with similar incomes and characteristics. In addition, Chêne (2008) 
shows that based on the World Bank Governance Indicators, MENA countries 
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perform above average in political stability, rule of law, and quality of 
administration, however, it performs below average for the transparency, voice 
accountability, and control of corruption.  
Within the same lines, Han, Khan, & Zhuang, (2014) analyzes the governance 
gap and its effect on economic growth. Among many other results, the study shows 
that “Middle East and North African countries with a surplus in political stability, 
government effectiveness, and corruption control are observed to grow faster than 
those with a deficit in these indicators by as much as 2.5 percentage points 
annually.” The study implies that governance matters to economic growth in the 
MENA region. 
Furthermore, Mehanna, Yazbeck, & Sarieddine (2010) study the relationship 
between governance and economic development in 23 MENA countries over the 
period 1996-2005. Their study compares different challenges facing the region 
including education, fixed investment, presence of religious fractionalization, and 
governance. The study shows that improving governance is the main challenge 
facing the MENA countries. The study shows that voice and accountability, 
government effectiveness, and control of corruption exert the strongest economic 
impact on economic development. 
Additionally, Emara & Jhonsa (2014) shows that despite the low performance 
of most of MENA countries on almost all the six measures of World Bank 
Governance Indicators, their estimated levels per capita of income are relatively 
higher than the rest of the countries in the sample. This study concludes that most 
of these countries have achieved relatively high but fragile standard of living that is 
not based on sound governance.  
According to the latest available World Governance Indicator data for the Voice 
and Accountability metric, show that 16 of the Middle East and North Africa 
region’s 21 largest countries by population were given a negative Governance 
Score, and ranked in the 38
th
 percentile or lower. For the Political Stability metric, 
15 out of 21 were given a negative score and ranked in the 36
th
 percentile or lower. 
For the Government Effectiveness metric, 12 out of 21 nations had negative scores, 
and 3 out of 21 ranked below the 25
th
 percentile. For Regulatory Quality, 15 out of 
21 had negative scores, and 6 out of 21 again ranked below the 25
th
 percentile. For 
Rule of Law, 11 out of 21 had negative scores, and 4 out of 21 ranked below the 
25
th
 percentile. And for Control of Corruption, negative scores were given to 13 out 
of 21 nations, with 4 out of 21 ranking below the 25
th
 percentile. 
Despite the MENA governments’ effort to enhance the level of governance, the 
World Bank’s Governance Indicators show no significant change across all 
indicators, namely rule of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness, 
voice and accountability and regulatory quality for the MENA region over the 
period between 2007 and 2014. Of course looking at the MENA governance 
indicators, one can tell that the performance between these countries has been non-
uniform. Countries such as Bahrain, Cyprus, Israel, Oman, Turkey, and United 
Arab Emirates have performed relatively better than the rest of the MENA 
countries. And with no doubt, given the recent political instability in Syria, the data 
shows that Syria is the worst of the list of the MENA countries in terms of all 
governance indicators. The data shows that Yemen and Iraq are following Syria in 
terms of low levels of governance quality especially for the political stability index. 
The Open Budget Index of 2015
1 , which reflects government’s social 
 
1 The Open Budget Initiative monitors the availability of seven key budget documents: Pre-Budget 
Statement, Executive’s Budget Proposal, Enacted Budget, In-Year Reports, Mid-Year Reports, 
Mid-Year Review, Year-End Report, and Audit Report. The index also records the presence of 
Citizens’ Budgets. 
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accountability, shows that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, and Algeria 
have recorded the lowest levels with a score of “scant or none (0-20)”. 
Furthermore, freedom of the citizens to express their opinions in political matters 
and the freedom of the press has been highly restricted in countries such as Egypt, 
Iran, and Saudi Arabia. As Pintak, L. (2011) wrote about the Arab’s media poor 
standard of delivering services to its citizens “A free media is not necessarily a 
credible media.” So it’s not only a matter of freedom but it is also a matter of 
credibility.   
In general, the extent to which citizens of the MENA region have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society have been generally very week. The rule of law 
index is relatively the worst for Iraq, Syria, and Yemen with an average of -1.29. 
Furthermore, what makes matters worse is for a country such as Egypt with a 
relatively strong legal framework (score -0.60) it’s the problem lies in the 
implementation of such legislations.  This means that the problem of governance is 
not only about its existence but also more importantly about the mechanism 
through which it can be implemented to positively affect the society.  
Additionally, countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Djibouti, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen 
suffer from relatively high levels of corruption with an average index of -1.02. 
Some of these countries have taken steps to fight corruption but still more efforts 
need to be done. For instance, Egypt has signed many international projects to fight 
corruption such as the MENA-OECD Task Force on Anti-Bribery, OECD Good 
Governance for Development in Arab Countries Initiative, the Arab Anti-
Corruption and Integrity Network (ACINET), and the UNDP-POGAR project to 
support the Ministry of Investment in the fight against corruption (OECD, 2009). 
However, no significant change has happened and a lot still needs to be done from 
the side of the government such as developing a nationwide anti-corruption 
strategy. 
Against the above background this study seeks to provide a comprehensive 
index of governance and estimate its impact on economic growth. Specifically, this 
study will attempt to answer the following questions: how does economic growth 
change as the comprehensive index of governance changes? Which component of 
governance is more important in explaining variations of economic growth among 
different countries? How these results are interpreted for the MENA region?  
This study is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the regression model and 
the methodology of the principal component analysis. Section 3 discusses the data 
set used. Section 4 analyzes the estimation results. Section 5 concludes this study. 
Section 6 includes the references. Finally, the appendix appears at this study.  
 
2. Empirical Specification 
(i) Regression Model  
Following Kaufmann & Kraay (2002), our regression model is presented below: 
 
pgdpi =  + *govi + ei   (1) 
 
Where pgdp is the log per capita income, gov is the governance index, e 
represents all the other factors not included in this parsimonious equation, and 
finally the subscripts i represents the country. The estimate of  will provide 
information on the marginal contribution of improving governance to the per capita 
gdp growth in the long run.  
We present the construction of composite governance index (CGI) using the 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) method in this section. Statisticians and data 
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scientists have long adopted this data reduction PCA method in their work. 
However, it’s not popular in economists’ empirical tool bag yet.  
(ii) Principal Components Analysis 
Given a data matrix X with p variables and n observations, we can write it as 
the following: 
 
X = ; where i = 1…n, j = 1…p.   (2) 
 
Geometrically, the goal of the PCA is to project the data matrix X from p 
dimensions to a smaller dimension k, where k << p, meanwhile keeping as much 
information (i.e., variance maximization) as possible in this dimension-reduced 
data matrix with the size n by k
2
. Specifically, the PCA method replaces a large 
number of correlated variables (X1, … , Xp) with a smaller number of uncorrelated 
variables (Principal Components; PC1, … , PCk).  
Mathematically, the first principal component is a linear combination of X1 to 
Xp observed variables that accounts for the largest variance among them: 
 
PC1 = a1X1 + a2X2 + … + apXp   (3) 
 
In equation (3) the vector of coefficient aj (j = 1…p) is termed loading vector 
and is normalized to avoid inflating the variance of PC1. By the same token, the 
second principal component (PC2) is another linear combination of X variables that 
accounts for the largest variance among them, however, with a constraint; PC2 is 
required to be orthogonal to PC1. Theoretically, we are able to track as many 
principal components as the number of variables (p of them) in the data matrix X. 
But in practice, we search for a much smaller number of principal components 
(PCs) that is able to capture as much as information from the original set of X 
variables. We present the algorithm for deriving PCs in the following section. 
(ii) Algorithm to derive PCs 
The algorithm to uncover PCs is based on the singular value decomposition 
(SVD) method (I.T. Jolliffe, 2002). While there is no specific rule to select the 
number of PCs, we use four criteria to determine the appropriate number of PCs; 
they are Kaiser-Harris’s stopping rule (criteria), Cattell’s Scree test, Parallel 
analysis and Percent of cumulative variance (see J. Brown, an internet source on 
this topic). 
First, capital letter W is used to denote the variance-covariance matrix. Where 
W is related to data matrix X in the following form; W = 
1n
XX T

, a p*p matrix and 
the superscript “T” is the transpose operator. Since W is a symmetric matrix it can 
be diagonalized as follows: 
 
W = VVT   (4) 
 
 
2 Two excellent references that cover Principal Components Analysis method are “An Introduction to 
Statistical Learning/ with Applications in R” & “R in Action”. 
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In equation (4), V is a matrix of eigenvectors and  is diagonal matrix with the 
eigenvalues. The matrix V is essential in deriving PCs and it’s also termed 
Principal Axes. Apply the SVD method to X and we can obtain the following: 
 
X = UVT   (5) 
 
As mentioned earlier, X is the data matrix with dimension n by p. U and V are 
both orthogonal squared matrix with dimension n and p, respectively.  is diagonal 
with diagonal entries that represent singular values. 
There is a relationship between equation (4) and (5), that is: 
 
W = 
1n
XX T

 = 
1n
VUVU TTT

 )()(
 = 
1n
VV T2


  (6) 
 
 
Comparing equation (4) to (6), it can be seen that the square of singular values 
(from ) is actually the eigenvalues derived from the diagonalization of W (or 
X
T
X).  
Denote the eigenvalues j (j = 1…p). The size of each  to the sum of all s 
accounts for the proportion of variances in the original data matrix X that can be 
captured by the corresponding principal component. If we rearrange  in a 
descending order from 1 to p, 1 and the corresponding eigenvector (or first 
principal component PC1) accounts for the largest proportion of variances in X. In 
practice, correlation of matrix X is applied before deriving PCs to avoid scaling 
problem. To this end, the principal components are derived by post-multiplying 
data matrix X with the principal axes V. Alternatively, PCs can also be derived 
using the following equation:  
 
XV = UVTV = U   (7) 
 
According to equation (7), principal components (PCs) can be obtained using 
either one of the following outcome: 
 
PCs  XV  U   (8) 
  
3. Data 
The cross-sectional data set is obtained from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators and it covers 188 countries for the years 2009 and 2013, 
with special focus on 21 MENA countries
3
. The reason to choose these two 
specific years for this study is to make a comparison about the governance change 
before and after the Arab Spring that have started in Tunisia in 2010. For 
governance indicators, the Worldwide Governance Indicators is used which have 
been published annually since 1998. The data of the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators is compiled at the World Bank by Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobatón 
(1999) and Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi (2005). These indicators are based on 
some 30 opinion and perception-based surveys of various governance measures 
 
3 There are 22 MENA countries that include Algeria (DZA), Bahrain (BHR), Cyprus (CYP), Djibouti 
(DJI), Egypt (EGY), Iran (IRN), Iraq (IRQ), Israel (ISR), Jordan (JOR), Kuwait (KWT), Lebanon 
(LBN), Libya (LBY), Morocco (MAR), Oman (OMN), Qatar (QAT), Saudi Arabia (SAU), Syria 
(SYR), Tunisia (TUN), Turkey (TUR), United Arab Emirates (ARE), West Bank and Gaza (WBG), 
and Yemen (YEM). Syria is excluded in this study due to missing WGI data. 
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from investment consulting firms, non-government organizations, think tanks, 
governments, and multilateral agencies; and classified into six dimensions 
including government effectiveness, political stability, control of corruption and 
regulatory quality, voice and accountability, and rule of law
4
. Data on GDP per 
capita in 2005 purchasing power parity terms is sourced from the World 
Development Indicators. 
 
4. Empirical Outcomes & Findings 
We first report the loadings of the six principal components and the 
corresponding eigenvalues in Table 1. How many principal components are needed 
to capture the most variances in X? Kaiser–Harris criterion suggests retaining 
components with eigenvalues that are greater than one. In the Cattell Scree test, the 
eigenvalues s are plotted against their component numbers p. If a big bend is 
revealed, the components above this bend will be kept. In Figure 1, the blue line 
flattens out after the second component which is where the bend appears. In the 
Parallel analysis, a series of s are obtained based on simulation. If the eigenvalues 
obtained from X are greater than the average of simulated s, the corresponding 
principal components are selected. The cross symbols “x” in Figure 1 represent all 
the six eigenvalues. The three criteria presented in Figure 1 all indicate the first 
principal component should be selected; the cross symbol at the top left corner. 
While we do not show the percent of cumulative variance graphically, a quick 
computation using the eigenvalues presented at the bottom of Table 1, we can find 
that the first PC explains about 81%
5
 of variances from the original data set, X. 
We transform the original WGIs to a single composite governance index using 
the following computational process: 
 
PC1 = X*L1   (9) 
 
CGI = 
)max( 1
1
PC
PC
*100  (10) 
 
In equation (9), it shows that the first principal component is obtained by 
multiplying both data matrix X and the first loading L1 (the numerical elements in 
Italic style shown in the first column in Table 1). The Composite Governance 
Index (CGI) is the PC1 rescaled by dividing the largest element in the PC1. The 
histogram of the CGI is reported in Figure 2. It’s a bit skewed to the right. The 
median index is about -9.7, which is smaller than the zero mean. Our CGI indicates 
that Finland (FIN) has the best governance index that equals 100 and Afghanistan 
(AFG) has the lowest index that equals -88.85 among these 188 countries in our 
data. Based on the quartiles of the CGI, we also report the ranking of governance 
of these 21 MENA countries in Table 2.1. Among these MENA countries, Cyprus 
has the best governance ranking and Iraq has the lowest one. Does a better ranking 
in CGI indicate a better ranking in economic performance with reference to 
 
4 The detailed definition of each indicator is provided in the appendix. 
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average income? In Table 2.2 we present the ranking of the log of per capita GDP
6
 
according to the quartiles. Comparing Table 2.2 to 2.1, we can find that there are 
five countries (Israel, Lebanon, Qatar, West bank & Gaza, and Yemen) with the 
same exact rankings in both governance and average income. Additionally, it is 
apparent that the rankings in CGI and average income are positively associated; 
and their correlation coefficient is 45.75%.  
Knowing the ordinal rankings in both CGI and average income are positively 
associated, we further investigate how the CGI contributes to average income 
growth.  Using equation (1), we run a regression of the log of per capita GDP on 
the CGI and report the outcome in Table 3.1; the corresponding graphical outcome 
is presented in Figure 3.1. In Table 3.1, due to small p-values, both the t test and F 
test support the significance of slope estimate and validity of the model. The slope 
estimate indicates that per capita GDP grows by about 2% (0.0199) if the CGI 
increases by one unit. The multiple or adjusted R
2
 says that 53% of variation in log 
of per capita GDP can be explained by CGI.  
We also conduct another regression that is only based on these 21 MENA 
countries and report the outcome in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2. It can be seen that the 
estimated slope is 0.01804 that is a bit lower than the estimated slope of 0.0199 
from the whole sample of 188 countries. While the estimated slopes are similar, we 
do notice that the adjusted R
2
 drops significantly to 35.9%; this means CGI has less 
explaining power on log of per capita GDP for MENA countries. 
To this end, we make a comparison of the CGI and log of per capita GDP in 
both Year 2009 and 2013, and summarize our findings in Table 4. The CGI in 2013 
is obtained using the same loading derived in 2009. While we feel disappointed 
that the improvement in CGI doesn’t fully coincide with the economic growth in 
the MENA countries, the low adjusted R
2
 we found earlier in Table 3.2 may 
indicate that there are more factors involved in these countries’ economic growth in 
addition to the soundness of governance. For example, Fig. 3.1 shows that the 
MENA countries that are way above the regression line are mostly oil rich 
countries. Namely, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and 
United Arab Emirates are members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). With regards to both Table 2.1 and 2.2, we can also find that 
these oil rich countries have better rankings in their average income, but less 
impressive rankings in their governance performance.  
The results of Table 4 reveal interesting points. Over the period 2009 to 2013, 
only five of the countries in the MENA countries, namely United Arab Emirates, 
Algeria, Iraq, Israel, and West Bank and Gaza, have experienced an improvement 
in CGI that was accompanied by an enhancement in economic growth. 
Additionally, over the same period only one country in the sample, namely Iran, 
has experienced an improvement in its CGI with no change in economic growth. 
Furthermore, only four countries namely Cyprus, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, and 
Yemen have experienced deterioration in their CGI that was also accompanied 
with lower economic growth over the same period. Finally, or more importantly, 
over the same period about fifty percent of the MENA countries, namely Bahrain, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and 
Turkey have experienced deterioration in the CGI that was accompanied by an 
increase in economic growth. 
 
 
 
 
6 The logarithmic function is strictly monotonic on its entire domain, so the ranking of log of per 
capita GDP is same as per capita GDP that we use to represent average income. 
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5. Conclusion 
There are two main contributions in this paper. The first contribution is we are 
able to create a “composite governance index” (CGI) that summarizes the existing 
six governance measurements; the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), using 
the Principal Components Analysis (PCA). The first principal component derived 
from the WGIs explains as large as 81% of the variations in the original six WGI 
measurements, which indicates that it can be used as a strong indicator for 
evaluating government’s managerial ability and effectiveness. The second 
contribution is we are able to quantify the marginal contribution of improvement in 
governance on economic performance using PPP adjusted constant per capita GDP 
data. We find that the per capita GDP would rise by about 2% if the CGI increases 
by one unit. Using the Rule of 70, the marginal estimate further indicates a mere 
five-unit improvement in CGI would double a country’s per capita GDP in seven 
years.  
Our results suggest that nine countries of the MENA region have shown a 
positive correlation between governance and economic growth which includes 
those countries that have experience deterioration accompanied by deterioration 
and those countries that have experienced an enhancement accompanied by an 
enhancement in governance index and in economic growth, respectively. The 
relatively low R
2 
of 35.9% confirms these results. More specifically, the CGI 
explains only 35.9% of the variations in economic growth in the MENA region. 
Our results go in line with the findings of Emara & Jhonsa (2014) that the majority 
of the MENA countries have achieved fragile levels of economic growth that does 
not depend on sound governance.  Our next step in this research is to include more 
control variables in the MENA regression model and we hope that, by doing this, 
we can have a better qualitative prediction outcome on the link between 
governance and growth in this region. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A. Governance Indicators and Definitions 
1- Voice and 
accountability 
Measured by the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government as well as freedom of 
expression, association, and the press.  
2- Political stability and 
absence of violence 
Measured by the likelihood that a government will be destabilized by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including terrorism. 
3- Government 
effectiveness 
Measured by the quality of public services, the capacity of civil services 
and their independence from political pressure, and the quality of policy 
formulation.  
4- Regulatory quality Measured by the ability of a government to provide sound policies and 
regulations that enable and promote private sector development. 
5- Rule of law Measured by the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, including the quality of property rights, the police 
and the courts, and the risk of crime. 
6- Control of corruption Measured by the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption as well as elite 
“capture” of the state.  
 
Figure 1. Principal Component Selection Criteria 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The Distribution of Composite Governance Index 
 
Notes: Minimum = -88.8, Maximum = 100, Mean = 0, Median = -9.7, Q1 = -34.1, Q3 = 35.4 
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Figure 3.1. Linear Regression for All 188 Countries 
 
Figure 3.2. Linear Regression for 21 MENA Countries 
 
 
Table 1. Loadings of Principal Components 
WGI\Loadings of PCs L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 
Control of Corruption (corr) 0.4303 -0.062 0.2557 -0.6295 0.5808 -0.1095 
Government Effectiveness (ef) 0.431 -0.2729 0.2576 0.0263 -0.2887 0.7677 
Political Stability (ps) 0.3377 0.8773 0.1642 0.2728 0.0836 0.0892 
Regulatory Quality (rq) 0.415 -0.3868 0.0367 0.6964 0.337 -0.2799 
Rule of Law (rl) 0.4424 -0.02 0.1273 -0.1736 -0.6771 -0.5469 
Voice & Accountability (va) 0.3835 0.0454 -0.9076 -0.1167 0.0155 0.1152 
Eigenvalues () 4.8735 0.5509 0.3394 0.1414 0.0493 0.0455 
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Table 2.1. Governance Ranking According to the Quartiles 
Country CGI Rank Country CGI Rank 
ARE 28.10 2 KWT 13.56 2 
BHR 12.67 2 LBN -30.70 3 
CYP 58.25 1 LBY -45.35 4 
DJI -26.30 3 MAR -13.30 3 
DZA -41.87 4 OMN 16.69 2 
EGY -19.85 3 QAT 43.52 1 
IRN -58.69 4 SAU -13.49 3 
IRQ -71.26 4 TUN -3.55 2 
ISR 30.73 2 TUR 0.94 2 
JOR 3.08 2 WBG -34.46 4 
      YEM -59.40 4 
Notes: Rank = 1 if CGI > 35.4, Rank = 2 if -9.7 < CGI  35.4, Rank = 3 if -34.1 < CGI  -9.7, 
Rank = 4 if CGI  -34.1 
 
 
Table 2.2. (log) Per Capita Real GDP (LGDP) Ranking According to the Quartiles 
Country LGDP Rank Country LGDP Rank 
ARE 11.02 1 KWT 11.29 1 
BHR 10.61 1 LBN 9.66 3 
CYP 10.44 2 LBY 10.24 2 
DJI 7.86 4 MAR 8.74 4 
DZA 9.44 3 OMN 10.77 1 
EGY 9.19 4 QAT 11.70 1 
IRN 9.69 2 SAU 10.68 1 
IRQ 9.40 3 TUN 9.23 4 
ISR 10.25 2 TUR 9.65 3 
JOR 9.33 3 WBG 8.34 4 
      YEM 8.38 4 
Notes: Rank = 1 if LGDP > 10.6, Rank = 2 if 9.66 < LGDP  10.6, Rank = 3 if 9.23 < LGDP  9.66, 
Rank = 4 if LGDP  9.23 
 
Table 3.1. Impact of GCI on Economic Growth- All Countries 
Dependent variable:  Log Per Capita GDP 
Estimation Method: Linear Regression Model 
CGI 0.020*** 
p-value: < 2e-16 
Intercept  9.072*** 
p-value: < 2e-16 
Countries/Observations 188 
F (1, 186) statistic = 210 p-value: < 2e-16 
R-Squared 0.53 
Notes: ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
Table 3.2. Impact of GCI on Economic Growth- MENA Countries 
Dependent variable:  Log Per Capita GDP 
Estimation Method: Linear Regression Model 
CGI 0.018** 
p-value: 0.0024 
Intercept  9.986*** 
p-value: < 2e-16 
Countries/Observations 21 
F (1, 19) statistic = 12.2 p-value: 0.0024 
R-Squared 0.36 
Notes: ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 4. The Change in CGI and Growth between the Years 2009 and 2013  
Country CGI/09 CGI/13 Improve logY/09 logY/13 Growth 
ARE 28.10 32.26 4.16 11.02 11.02 YES 
BHR 12.67 -2.24 -14.91 10.61 10.64 YES 
CYP 58.25 51.03 -7.22 10.44 10.31 NO 
DJI -26.30 -36.58 -10.27 7.86 7.98 YES 
DZA -41.87 -40.31 1.56 9.44 9.49 YES 
EGY -19.85 -43.65 -23.80 9.19 9.22 YES 
IRN -58.69 -55.06 3.63 9.69 9.66 NO 
IRQ -71.26 -67.17 4.09 9.40 9.63 YES 
ISR 30.73 33.98 3.26 10.26 10.34 YES 
JOR 3.09 -6.42 -9.50 9.33 9.34 YES 
KWT 13.56 -3.35 -16.91 11.29 11.22 NO 
LBN -30.70 -34.57 -3.87 9.66 9.71 YES 
LBY -45.35 -75.04 -29.69 10.24 9.88 NO 
MAR -13.30 -16.00 -2.69 8.74 8.84 YES 
OMN 16.69 6.84 -9.84 10.77 10.57 NO 
QAT 43.52 37.57 -5.95 11.70 11.82 YES 
SAU -13.49 -13.64 -0.14 10.68 10.80 YES 
TUN -3.55 -14.09 -10.54 9.23 9.28 YES 
TUR 0.94 -1.84 -2.78 9.65 9.83 YES 
WBG -34.46 -33.21 1.25 8.34 8.41 YES 
YEM -59.40 -64.84 -5.45 8.38 8.21 NO 
Notes: CGI: composite governance index, Improve = CGI/13 – CGI/09  
logY = natural log of per capita GDP, Growth: whether logY/13 > logY/09 
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